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''Within Ourselves ... '' 
The Developm.ent of British Light 
Infantry in North America During the 
Seven Years' War 
Ian McCulloch 
" ... I am convinced. that till we have everything necessary. for carrying on the War 
here. within ourselves. Independent of Aidfrom this Country. we shall go on very 
slowly." 
Lord Loudon to the Duke of Cumberland, August, 1756. 
Introduction 
T he first British regulars to appear in North America were those accompanying a small 
British expedition to wrest Manhattan from the 
Dutch in 1664. Colonel Richard Nicolls' troops 
landed on Long Island 25 August 1664 at the 
exact site where General William Howe's troops 
would disembark over a century later. After a 
swift Dutch capitulation, Nicolls' redcoats and 
subsequent garrisons of British regulars would 
maintain a solid presence in New York for a 
virtually uninterrupted period of 119 years. 1 
It has been suggested by one American 
historian that this factual record has been 
conveniently overlooked by most of his 
colleagues in order that "the dismal episode of 
Braddock's defeat" can figure prominently in 
history books as the first appearance of British 
redcoats on the North American scene. Thus 
"they could be made to appear as stupid brutes 
led by an eighteenth century Colonel Blimp while 
American militia simultaneously appeared as a 
keen and valiant yeomanry led by that paragon 
of all virtue and destined military hero of the fight 
for American liberty, George Washington. "2 
His accusation is a valid one, but not very 
surprising, as much of early American history 
has become firmly embedded in myth, legend 
and folklore. "Braddock's Defeat," "The Massacre 
at Fort William Henry," "The Boston Massacre" 
and even "George Washington's Cutting Down 
the Cherry Tree" have all served a variety of 
purposes down through the centuries. All have 
become part of the "usable past" and have been 
extensively deployed in any discussions of one 
of those favourite themes of North American 
historians -the conflict between European and 
colonial values and methods. Inevitably 
European warfare vs. North American warfare 
(la petite guerre) has been drawn into the mythic 
vortex. :l Canadian historian l.K. Steele writes that 
"North American pride in the ways of the New 
World has often led to the assumption that, in 
warfare as in everything else, the new men of 
the New World were better than the history-laden 
men of the Old." Braddock's defeat more than 
any other engagement of the Seven Years' War 
has, "with some misrepresentation," been used 
as key evidence to support this assumption of 
superiority.4 Stanley Pargellis reinforces this view: 
Military historians hold that Braddock's defeat 
taught a lesson badly needed for the time: you 
cannot employ parade ground tactics in the 
bush. To almost everyone who in one 
connection or another remembers Braddock. 
this episode stands as a conflict between Old 
World and New World ways, with the outcome 
justifying the new.5 
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However, many historians led by Pargellis, 
with Paul Koppermans, Ian Strachan, and 
Steele in close support, stress that Braddock's 
defeat can no longer be perceived or used as 
such. 6 While broad generalizations about the 
utility of close-order formations in woods or the 
cunning and ruthlessness of Indian tactics or 
the command abilities of the young Washington 
may all be still true, they are not true as 
inferences from Braddock's defeat. The general 
consensus now is that Braddock's debacle was 
precipitated in large part by his critical neglect 
on the day of battle to observe the fundamental 
rules of war laid down in the European manuals 
of the day. His leadership lapse and 
complacency once nearing his objective meant 
that his soldiers were never given a chance to 
demonstrate that Old World methods, properly 
applied, might have very well won the day. 7 His 
column from the day it launched into the North 
American wilderness adopted well-conceived 
and generally well-executed security measures 
as per the manuals. On the day however, these 
careful measures were inexplicably not ordered 
nor implemented by Braddock and his staff and 
their absence was enough to ensure the ruin of 
their army and give British officers a reputation 
for ineptitude under frontier conditions. 8 
This reputation is undeserved, for British 
regulars took especial care to prepare 
themselves for the American theatre, including 
Braddock and subsequent commanders. After 
Braddock's defeat no inferior guerilla force 
would ever overcome any substantial body of 
British regulars during the Seven Years' War in 
North America. 
"BB"- Before Braddock 
The first English settlers in Virginia and New England arrived with a minimum of 
professional military support. In 1607, the 
Jamestown settlers heeding Captain John 
Smith's advice formed" .. .immediately into three 
groups: one to erect fortifications for defence, 
one to serve as a guard and to plant a crop, a 
third to explore."9 They encountered hostile 
Indians almost immediately and, for many 
decades, had to rely on standing militia forces. 
Ironically, this ancient British tradition of the 
militia, on the decline in England since Oliver 
42 
Cromwell's time, took on a new vitality in 
America. Each colony, as it became established, 
was obliged to create its own militia for 
protecting and extending its frontiers. 
Cooperation amongst the militias of the various 
colonies was confined to specific expeditions in 
which two or more colonies had a mutual 
interest. Organized into units by county or 
township, the militia rarely fought as formed 
units. Instead, the local unit served as a training 
and mobilization base from which individuals 
could be selected for active operations. 10 
The effectiveness of the colonial militias 
varied from bad to very good, their prowess 
increasing proportionately to their proximity to 
the Indian frontier and the no-man's-land 
between New England and New France. The 
seventy year struggle for the North American 
continent commencing in 1689 consisted, in fact, 
of four separate wars. The first three: the War of 
the League of Hapsburg ( 1689-1697). the War of 
the Spanish Succession (1702-1713) and, the 
War of the Austrian Succession (1744-1748), 
were fought by the colonists of both mother 
countries using colonial methods and military 
resources to hand. The French utilized their 
Indian allies from the outset and armed them 
with muskets. The American frontier militias 
were thus forced to assimilate the best features 
of Indian tactics in order to effectively counter 
their enemy: small-unit operations, loose 
formations, informal dress, swift movement, fire 
discipline, ambush and surprise attack. Aided 
by a greater population base and their own 
Indian allies, many American frontiersmen 
became adept at marksmanship, a skill which 
increased as more accurate weapons were 
developed. 11 
Russell Weigley, an American military 
historian, states. however. that "as the frontier 
receded. the inhabitants of older communities 
gradually lost their skills in shooting. forest lore. 
and Indian fighting. More and more the militia 
of long-settled communities had to rely not on 
frontier experience but on European military 
manuals to guide them in their training. "12 
Orthodoxy advanced to such an extent that at 
the outbreak ofthe Seven Year's War (The French 
and Indian War to the Americans), militia 
commanders were being advised by Colonel 
Washington to study war from Humphrey Bland's 
Treatise on Military Discipline, the leading 
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Above: Indian auxiLliary with scalp. by Brigadier 
General George Townshend. ca.l 759. 
(Author's collection) 
Right: An Iroquois Warrim: He is formidably armed 
with a ball club, iron-headed tomahawk and a 
J1intlock. Note the snowshoes, which would greatly 
increase his mobility in the snow. and the enemy 
scalp draped ouer the barrel of his gun. 
(David M. Sieww'L Museum) 
English tactical manual of the day. These 
recommendations were no doubt based on 
Washington's less than charitable opinions of 
colonial militiamen as expressed in 1755: 
Mililia, you will find ... never answer your 
expectations. no dependence is to be placed 
on them: they are obstinate and perverse, they 
are egged on by the officers. who lead them to 
acts of disobedience, and when they are 
ordered to certain posts for the security of 
stores, or the protection of the inhabitants. will, 
on a sudden. resolve to leave them, and the 
united vigilance of their officers can not prevent 
the1n.'" 
Washington was not under any illusions 
either of their utility in forest warfare against 
the French Indian auxiliaries. He wrote that 
"without Indians, we shall never be able to cope 
with those cruel foes to our country. Indians 
are the only match for Indians; and without 
these, we shall ever fight on unequal terms." 14 
His views on colonial militia pre-dated one 
British writer who wrote in 1758: 
Our people are nothing but a set of farmers 
and planters, used only to the axe and hoe -
[the Canadians] are not only well trained and 
disciplined, but they are used to arms from 
their infancy among lndians; and are reckoned 
equal, if not superior in that part of the world 
to veteran troops ... These [Canadians] are 
troops that fight without pay - maintain 
themselves in woods without charges march 
without baggage - and support themselves 
without stores and magazines ... "' 
In general, the colonial militias before 
Braddock were not useful unless fighting 
directly in defence of their own homes and 
families. Colonial expansion was mostly 
accomplished by simple appropriation and 
settlement - or dubious purchases and deals 
rather than through any coordinated military 
action by militias. Weigley concludes that "in 
general, the colonial militias were not a reliable 
instrument of offensive war distant from their 
own firesides .... Militia training did not prepare 
them for extended campaigns, nor did militia 
organization befit the maintenance of long 
43 
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expeditions."16 Thus, a long campaign 
to distant fields that also involved 
meeting Indian tactics of stealth and 
ambuscade, was one for which 
colonial militias (except ranger 
units recruited exclusively from 
frontiersmen) were eminently 
unsuited and, moreover, one in 
which they were unwilling to 
participate. Governor Robert 
Dinwiddie, however, knew 
where to find men to meet the 
challenge. He wrote to his friend 
James Abercromby in England: 
"I am still of Opinion without force 
from Home, we shall hardly be able 
to drive the French from the Ohio; 
we want Military Men, and particularly 
In gin eers." 1 7 
Were the "Military Men," the British regulars, 
equal to the task? Were they capable of waging 
protracted campaigns in a virtual wilderness 
against elusive adversaries well-versed in all 
aspects of irregular warfare? Some perhaps were 
not prepared for the ruthless savagery of scalping 
and cannibalism encountered, but many soldiers 
and their officers were well inured to irregular 
warfare and skirmishing either from experiences 
in Scotland or on the battlefields of Europe. 
Various scholars argue that the modified 
integrated infantry tactics that came to dominate 
European battlefields from the middle of the 
1 790s were primarily an organic European 
development extending over the previous century. 
These developments slowly but gradually 
combined the techniques of linear formations 
with those of irregular auxiliaries (Pandours, 
Croats, Rangers et al), with regular specialists 
in open order who were already members of the 
line (light companies) and with elite units such 
as jaegers and chasseurs. Colonial experience, 
they argue, tended only to reinforce existing 
trends already in train and not to initiate them. 18 
The historical record bears this out, though it 
will be seen that all three developments 
simultaneously occurred within the British 
infantry in North America during the Seven Years' 
War. 
The War of the Austrian Succession ( 17 40-
1748) and the Jacobite Rebellion (1745-1746) 
were the training grounds for most of the British 
44 
Marshal Maurice de Saxe. one of the "Great 
Captains" oj 18'" century w'arrare. was 
a proponent of light irifantry tactics. 
(Print after a 1 7 48 portmil by Quentin 
de La Tour. Photo: R. Chartrand.) 
officers who served in North 
America during the Seven 
Years' War. It was the former 
war in which irregular troops 
were first employed on a large 
scale by modern armies. 19 In 
l 7 40-l 7 41, the young Austrian 
Empress. Maria Theresa. 
mobilized her Croatian and 
Hungarian military borders (or 
buffer zones) created to protect her 
empire from the Ottoman Empire. The 
Serb-Croat and Pandour troops thus 
generated were then moved to the central front 
for the first time in an attempt to eject Frederick 
the Great's troops from Silesia. They performed 
invaluable service in every campaign and by 17 44 
Field Marshal Traun had successfully forced the 
Prussians out of Bohemia by constant attacks 
on Frederick's supply lines and by harassing his 
forage parties. Over 40,000 Serbo-Croatian 
"Grenzer" would serve in the Hapsburg armies 
during the War, increasing to about 88,000 
during the Seven Years' War. These fierce 
"irregulars" were usually dispatched on 
independent operations against enemy outposts, 
supply centres and lines of communication, but 
some-times played a small part on the battlefield 
as sharpshooters posted on the flanks. 20 
The French army adapted to this new aspect 
of warfare from the outset. The Bohemian 
campaign brought Maurice de Saxe to the fore, 
a subordinate general who, based on his 
extensive experience with light troops in Eastern 
Europe and as an author of the first modern 
treatise to deal with the subject, raised a number 
of compagnies ]ranches or "free companies" of 
the French Army in 1744. He eventually 
commanded five regiments of light troops during 
the campaign, each combining infantry and 
cavalry operating together. At Fontenoy in 1745, 
Saxe used his light troops on the battlefield itself, 
sending a screen of skirmishers against the 
British centre while he deployed his army. He 
also stationed Monsieur de Grassin's new 1200-
strong Regiment des Arquebusiers on his left 
where their deadly independent fire or feu de 
4
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The Chevalier Claude de Grassin led the 
most outstanding light corps during the 
Austrian Succession War, the 
Arquebusiers de Grassin which 
existedfrom 1744 to 1749. 
(Prini aJier poriraii atlributed io 
Duplessis. Photo: R. Chartrand.) 
chasseur repulsed a British 
attempt on that flank Major-
General J.F.C. Fuller writes 
that "Grass in's troops were the 
first true light infantry of 
modern times, behaving 
splendidly at Fontenoy and 
deciding the battle of Mesle. 21 
Saxe also used them at Lauffeldt, 
against the British, who quickly 
gained a great deal of respect for this 
eighteenth century commander and 
studied his writings on war carefully. 22 
Flanders. where British soldiers fought 
principally against French troops, exemplified 
the same type of fighting that had characterised 
warfare in Germany, Bohemia, Sardinia and 
Italy. The traditional operations and ponderous 
movements of armies, convoys and 
detachments between the set-piece battles and 
sieges were being increasingly affected by the 
activities of irregulars in all theatres of 
operations. Professionals in all armies 
recognised that by the end of the 17 40s, 
irregular light troops and regular light infantry 
had a role in wartime, if only to defend one's 
own forces against those of the enemy. The 
British forces in Flanders were, therefore, 
directly and continuously exposed to these new 
tactical developments as practised by ally and 
enemy alike. 
The Jacobite Rebellion of 1745-1746 
presented the British Army with some very 
special problems of fighting in mountainous 
terrain against a very agile, mobile and hardy 
adversary. Highland clans were well-versed in 
the guerilla raid, stealth and surprise and many 
British commanders including Wolfe and Bland 
were complimentary about their warlike skills 
and tactical acumen. Fuller goes so far as to 
say that the Black Watch in their first iteration 
were an "irregular police" who, wise in the ways 
of the Highlands, were the best-equipped light 
troops to deal with Highland raiders and 
robbers. 23 By Fontenoy, however, the 
Black Watch were a regular heavy 
infantry regiment of the line, albeit 
equipped with a uniform that 
allowed them greater mobility 
as well as broadswords and 
Highland pistols for close-
quarter fighting. 24 
It was open field tactics at 
Falkirk and Prestonpans by 
the Highlanders, however, and 
not the irregular warfare that 
flared up on the periphery of the 
Rebellion, that defeated the 
conventional British infantry of 
the day. In early 17 46, British forces 
found themselves engaged in constant 
irregular warfare; the Chevalier de 
Johnstone, a Jacobite staff officer who served 
with the Marquis de Montcalm at Quebec, 
remarked that "Lord Loudon with his (Highland) 
corps frequently harassed and annoyed 
us ... keeping us continually on the alert." 
However, Jacobite general Lord George Murray's 
counter moves drove Loudon's men away from 
their base at Inverness allowing Murray to 
emerge and launch a series of surprise attacks 
on Cumberland's outposts and supply lines. 
Johnstone believed that "this bold enterprise 
had a very good effect, and made such an 
impression on the English that, conceiving 
themselves insecure everywhere, they were 
obliged to redouble their service in the midst of 
winter."25 
Many Highlanders however soon came 
to respect the ability of the English infantry or 
"red soldiers" to function in mountainous 
terrain and the professional behaviour of its 
commander. On one occasion, General Bland, 
author of the widely-used Treatise on Discipline, 
marched with a force of regular horse and foot, 
screened with a force of"Campbells before him" 
as well as ''the Laird of Graunt [sic] and 100 of 
his followers." Surrounded by fog, Bland 
received word back of a possible ambush ahead. 
He halted his column, took up defensive 
positions and sent a heavily-armed detachment 
forward to investigate. On the "all clear," Bland 
went forward again assuming his previous 
march discipline. 26 
45 
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"AB" - Mter Braddock 
B ritish commanders after Braddock found that war in North America was essentially 
one of geography with such vast problems of 
communication and supply that their principal 
task of generalship was simply in moving a force 
of moderate size into contact with the enemy. 
With the French on the strategic defensive, it 
was the British and Americans who had to 
penetrate hundreds of miles into trackless and 
unsettled country. 
American historians, John Shy and Pargellis 
have underlined the problems of administration 
and logistics throughout the War, and agree that 
the aptitude of a few individuals for strategy 
and tactics cannot be an adequate explanation 
of success or failure in the North American 
conflict. Shy observes that "the forces of nature 
were so nearly overwhelming that the French 
and Indian War had to be a war of organisation 
and administration. It was a siege on a grand 
scale. '027 Essential auxiliaries needed by any 
general aspiring to take New France by the Lake 
Champlain route included bateauxmen, 
artillery and, especially, engineers. In Pargellis' 
estimation, the requirement also included "a 
small mobile force of trained officers and men, 
with enough reserves to garrison captured posts 
and maintain a lengthening line of 
communication. In brief, the British needed a 
small, highly trained army of experts, some of 
whom could only be found in the colonies."28 
This, then, sets the stage for the arrival of 
Braddock who has already been discussed and 
provides our starting point. Shy notes that 
"American conditions weighted the classic 
tension of warfare- boldness versus caution, 
surprise versus security - in favour of the 
cautious approach. Only bad luck could nullify 
the natural English superiority, and only 
rashness or faulty logistics could enhance the 
possibility of bad luck. "29 Braddock had 
crippling supply problems, then lost his battle 
through a single careless act. To future 
commanders the message was clear: leave 
nothing to chance and take no risks. 
Braddock's successor was John Campbell, 
Earl of Loudon, a Highlander officer well-versed 
in irregular warfare from service during the 
Jacobite Rebellion. Loudon's immediate task 
was to build a serviceable army from the remains 
of Braddock's regiments, garrison soldiers, 
provincials, and new units from Britain, as well 
as creating a logistical system during 1756-1757 
that would form the basis of ultimate victory. 
With Braddock's defeat fresh in everyone's 
memory, Loudon was deeply concerned with how 
his troops would fare in "the Bush fight in which 
the [French) have so great an advantage by their 
Canadians and Indians." Loudon was of the 
opinion in late 1756 that "it is impossible for an 
Army to act in this Country without Rangers," 
the latter a group of experienced frontiersmen 
raised by William Shirley the year before for 
reconnaissance and patrolling duties.30 Led by 
Robert Rogers, the Rangers were Americans, but 
must not be confused with the American 
provincial or militia regiments. Pargellis writes: 
It is an easy fashion today to imagine that every 
colonial was an adept in Indian warfare, or that if 
they could not all follow a trail with Deerslayer's 
Major Robert Rogers, commander of a unit that 
specialized in irregular waifare and bush fighting. 
(Author's Collection) 
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Private, 60th Regiment of Foot (Royal Americans), 
ca.l 755-1 763. The regimentals consisted of red coat 
and waistcoat, without the usual decorative lace 
trimmings, blue coat cuffs, lapels, turnbacks and 
breeches, pewter buttons, tricorn with white lace 
and black cockade. Buff leather accoutrements and 
armed with musket and bayonet. The white gaiters 
were for dress parades. Brown "marching" gaiters 
or green Indian-style leggings with red garters were 
otherwise used. 
(Print after reconstruction by 
P. W. Reynolds. Photo: R. Chartrand.) 
adeptness at least they knew some tricks of 
the woods and could take care of themselves. 
That is a fond delusion. Loudon would have 
been only too glad if it had been true, if he 
could have depended on colonial woodsmen to 
provide for his command in America what 
British troops could not provide - a knowledge 
of the region and oflndian fighting .... But most 
of the provincial army came from long-settled 
communities which had never seen an Indian 
in war-paint ... 31 
Loudon's gloomy letter crossed one from the 
Duke of Cumberland advising Loudon to "teach 
your troops to go out on Scouting Parties; for 
'till Regular Officers with men that they can trust, 
learn to beat the woods, and to act as Irregulars, 
you will never gain any certain Intelligence of the 
Enemy."32 Loudon decided to use a combination 
of regulars and rangers. Regulars were trained 
to face both French regulars and irregulars 
(Canadians and Indians). 
Of particular note is Loudon's surviving 
1756 training directive to his four battalion 
commanders of the Royal American Regiment 
(60th Foot). a new regiment raised in America 
of which he was the first Colonel-Commandant. 
The Royal Americans were ordered to dress 
exactly like line regiments of the British army 
less regimental lace but to train specifically for 
their proposed role in forest warfare. 
Instructions included firing "at Marks, and in 
order to qualify them for the Service of the 
Woods, they are to be taught to load and fire, 
lyeing on the Ground and kneeling. They are to 
be taught to march in order, slow and faste in 
all sorts of Ground. They are frequently to pitch 
& fold up their Tents and to be accustomed to 
pack up and carry their necessities in the most 
commodious manner. "33 
Bush tactics and dress were soon put into 
practise. British soldiers acting as a covering 
party or vanguard learned to march in single file; 
if they fell into an ambush, the command "Tree 
all" was given and every man found a tree and 
looked out for himself. Various suggestions were 
made from time to time to make the regular 
troops better fitted for the American milieu: 
George Scott of the 40th (and later Amherst's 
and Wolfe's commander of Rangers at 
Louisbourg and Quebec respectively) devised 
plans to lighten equipment and reduce firing 
motions; James Prevost another Swiss-born 
Royal American battalion commander who 
shared with countrymen Henri Bouquet and 
Frederick Haldimand a penchant for "la petite 
guerre," went so far as to advocate the formation 
of strictly American regiments, clothed for the 
wilderness, armed with short, light guns, trained 
47 
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to swim, run and leap obstacles in 
obedience to the blast of the whistle, 
and to be accompanied by dogs for 
chasing the Indians. 34 
Loudon, acting on 
Cumberland's advice, sent 56 
volunteer gentlemen from all 
of his regular regiments to 
Robert Rogers for intensive 
training on all aspects of 
irregular warfare and "bush 
fighting." According to Rogers, 
Loudon ordered him to instruct 
his charges "to the utmost of my 
power in the ranging discipline, our 
methods of marching, retreating, 
ambushing and fighting, etc, 
Loudon fell from grace at the same 
time as Cumberland did in England 
and was replaced by Abercromby 
in the winter of 1757-1758. 
William Pitt knew Abercromby 
to be weak and thus ensured 
the Commander-in-Chief was 
well-seconded by the dynamic 
and well-loved Brigadier Lord 
George Augustus Howe. Howe 
was described by Wolfe as 
"that great man" and "the best 
soldier in the British army."39 
American historian Francis 
Parkman claims it was Howe that 
"broke through the traditions of 
that they might be the better 
qualified for any future services 
against the enemy we had to 
contend with .... "35 
General Jeffery Amherst 
(Author's Collection) 
the service and gave it new shapes 
to suit the time and place." 
Howe studied forest warfare 
and joined Rogers's Rangers 
on several raiding parties, 
Loudon's intentions in training regulars was 
to turn them into a regular "light infantry corps" 
according to Pargellis. 36 Major General James 
Abercromby, Loudon's second-in-command and 
destined to succeed him a few months later, was 
openly supportive of the plan. He wrote that "the 
present Rangers ... might be reduced or brought 
down to reasonable terms of pay if a light infantry 
Corps was established which I am confident 
would discharge all the functions of Rangers in 
a short time, better than those in your present 
pay."37 In December 1757, however, Loudon 
substituted this plan with the creation of a 
regiment of lightly-armed infantry, "Gage's Light 
Infantry" or the 80th Foot. Pargellis writes: 
48 
The importance of this move in the history of 
irregular warfare is very great; it was the 
natural and inevitable failure of the provincial 
rangers to fulfil the function of acting as 
irregular troops. Gage's regiment constituted 
the first definitely light-armed regiment in the 
British army; the firelocks issued to them were 
"cut shorter and the stocks dressed to make 
them lighter" Composed as far as possible of 
woodsmen, it was officered by men who [were 
trained in] Rogers' methods and were also 
trained in regular discipline. Mter two years 
experience with local devices, the British army 
took partly into its own hands the function 
deemed to be most peculiarly American. 38 
sharing all their hardships and making himself 
one of them. The reforms he introduced were 
the fruits of this rough imposed schooling. 
British officers and men were ordered to "throw 
off all useless encumbrances, cut their hair 
close, wear leggings to protect them from briers, 
brown the barrels of their muskets, and carry 
in their knapsack 30 pounds of meal." Until 
his untimely death during the approach march 
on Ticonderoga in 1 758, this veteran officer of 
Flanders (and defacto ground commander of 
troops in North America) effectively used 
rangers and light infantry to reconnoitre enemy 
positions, screen the advance of heavy columns, 
protect those columns while preparing for the 
assault, and in guarding the retreat. 40 
General Jeffery Amherst replaced 
Abercromby in autumn 1758 after the 
Ticonderoga debacle, and, like Loudon and 
Howe, he formed and used light infantry units 
and continued to adapt the arms and equipment 
of the regulars to wilderness conditions. He 
ordered all regular battalion commanders in the 
winter of 1758-1 759 "to practise their men at 
firing at marks, whenever the weather permitted; 
to form a company of men from each regiment. 
and those to be the most active, with Proper 
Officers: These to be called the light infantry of 
the regiments they belonged to ... " They were also 
to be "dressed agreable [sic] to the pattern given 
by the General, and armed with a carbine and 
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bayonet only."41 Amherst's younger 
brother and ADC, William Amherst, 
admired the active professionalism 
of these particular regulars and 
wrote in his journal that the 
"Light Infantry are certainly of 
great use & should always 
accompany than Army in this 
country, as these troops drive 
them out of their shelter, 
harass them continually& 
treat them in their way."42 
By spring 1760, such was 
The Light Infantryman's large tricorn 
hat was to be cut down into a cap 
"with as much black cloth added 
as will come under his chin and 
keep him warm when he lies 
down."44 
Wolfe's professionalism and 
common sense was born of 
experience in Germany and 
Flanders where he served from 
1742 to 1745. In 1746 he saw 
action at Falkirk and Culloden 
and had held a small 
independent command in hostile 
territory of the southern 
the high calibre of training and 
skill of these troops that General 
Amherst confidently sent his newly-
promoted brother to the 
forefront of his force to 
command these elite troops on 
the advance to Montreal. The 
Major-General James Wolfe 
(McCord Musseum) 
Highlands. Returning to Flanders 
the following year, he was 
wounded at Lauffeldt and. 
when subsequently promoted 
to Lieutenant-Colonel of the 
young Amherst proudly wrote that on one 
forward reconnaissance-in-force "we lost our way 
[back] & did not reach the Camp until after dark, 
through swamps & the thickest wood we could 
meet with." He confessed to be glad of it "as it 
shewed the temper of the Corps, expecting to lay 
out all night, without any covering or anything 
to eat or drink. The bon volonte and cheerfulness 
I had before met with amongst them still 
subsisted, & I conceive they know no difficulties. 
It is a pleasure serving with such a Corps."43 
Major-General James Wolfe, who served as 
one of Amherst's brigadiers at Louisbourg, 
shared his superior's belief in the utility of light 
infantry in North America. Wolfe was an energetic 
reformer in dress, tactics and training of regulars 
to meet the irregular warfare he knew would 
plague the peripheries of his siege camps around 
Quebec. Wolfe ordered that the ad hoc companies 
of light infantry, first started at Louisbourg by 
Amherst, remove their lace for his pending 
campaign against Quebec. In addition, their 
heavy redcoats were to be discarded in favour of 
their waistcoats with the sleeves of their frock 
coats sewn on as well as extra pockets for ball 
and flint. Knapsacks were to be carried higher 
and fastened with "a strap of web over the 
shoulders, as the Indians carry their pack." 
Cartridge boxes were to be carried hung under 
the left arm, powder horns issued and slung on 
the right, and tomahawks hung from the belt. 
20th Foot, found himself with his regiment on 
garrison duties in Scotland and southern 
England. During that time he established 
himself as one of the best trainers in the 
contemporary British army for men and officers 
alike. Whereas most British regiments attached 
little importance to target practise, Wolfe was a 
firm believer in marksmanship being a decisive 
combat multiplier before ever setting foot in 
North America; in 1755, he wrote from Scotland 
to a friend: 
We fire bullets continually, and have great need 
of them .... Marksmen are nowhere so necessary 
as in a mountainous country; besides, firing 
balls at objects teaches the soldier to level 
incomparably, makes the recruit steady, and 
removes the foolish apprehension that seizes 
young soldiers when they first load their arms 
with bullets. We fire first singly, then by files, 
1,2,3, or more, then by ranks, then lastly by 
platoons; and the soldiers see the effect of their 
shot especially at a mark, or upon water. We 
shoot obliquely. and in different situations of 
ground, from heights downwards and 
con trarywise. 45 
Wolfe was a new breed of British army officer 
who had made a thorough study of his military 
profession, reading classical works, engineering 
and drill texts, Marshal Saxe and, especially, the 
latest French contemporary treatises on "la 
petite guerre." Writing in 1756 to a friend seeking 
expert advice and instruction for his brother 
49 
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entering the army, Wolfe recommended 
the aspiring officer to read, amongst 
others, "the Comte de Turpin's 
book [Essai sur l'Art de la Guerre, 
Paris, l 754] ... and a little 
volume entitled "Traite de la 
petite Guerre," that your 
brother should take in his 
pocket when he goes upon 
out-duty and detachments. "46 
Wolfe, on his return from 
Louisbourg, was told by Pitt 
that he would command the 
Quebec Expedition and 
immediately set about gathering 
a cadre of experienced officers for 
his Light Infantry Corps. He 
wrote to Lord Sackville: 
irregulars harassed the British army 
with great success. After the 
collapse and complete rout of the 
French regulars from the field, 
this same group of French 
irregulars inflicted numerous 
casualties on the British line 
regiments who broke ranks to 
pursue their regular 
adversaries. It was only when 
the Light Infantry moved 
forward and the line regiments 
reformed into company-sized 
groups that they were finally 
able to clear this last menace 
from the battlefield."49 
Carden the American has a 
great deal of merit, but wants 
Colonel Henri Bouquet 
(Author's Collection) 
Thus during the Quebec 
campaign, we have the 
synthesis of the "trained" light 
infantryman - a disciplined, 
bread to eat. He is an excellent fellow for the 
woods .... He is bold, circumspect and more 
artful than his appearance bespeaks - has 
experience in the method of the American war 
beyond anybody that I can hear of; I hope we 
shan't lose such a subject so particularly 
adapted to this sort of workY 
From the time Wolfe's army landed on the 
lie d'Orlean and established fortified camps 
around Quebec, the army's movements were 
well-protected and screened by light infantry 
and rangers. Wolfe's orders to his light infantry 
were explicit and succinct and, as the summer 
progressed, the intensity of the irregular warfare 
increased to a point where Brigadier George 
Townshend wrote that it was "A Scene of 
Skirmishing, Cruelty and Devastation. It is War 
of the Worst Shape."48 
Wolfe's Light Infantry were also instrumental 
in assisting the main body to get up and onto 
the plains of Abraham to conduct the main battle. 
They landed first, took Vergor's Camp and the 
Samos battery (both guarding the Foulon Cove) 
in reverse then, guided the main body to the 
battlefield. These important duties completed, 
they spent the rest of the battle guarding the 
vulnerable rear (Bougainville's force of 2,000 
men was at Cap Rouge) of Wolfe's army and 
actually taking post in the line on the embattled 
left flank where a cloud of Canadien and Indian 
50 
regular soldier - proficient in all aspects of 
irregular warfare but capable of falling back into 
line during a set-piece battle. This multi-
talented British light infantry under Howe and 
Wolfe at Quebec anticipated by three decades 
the French light companies of the Napoleonic 
period, the latter described by Peter Paret as "a 
new all-purpose infantry, in which each soldier 
could fight in the line, in column, as a 
skirmisher, and on detached missions. "50 
The last refinement and proof of the 
developmental progress of the British light 
infantry during the Seven Years' War was to occur 
at an obscure spot in the Pennsylvanian 
v.rilderness. At Bushy Run, a small force of regular 
soldiers comprising the light and grenadier 
companies of the Black Watch, Royal Americans 
and Montgomery's Highlanders under Colonel 
Henri Bouquet decisively routed a much larger 
Indian force utilizing company manoeuvre and 
small unit tactics. Their commander was an 
experienced Swiss officer, recruited from the 
Dutch service to be one of the four original Royal 
American battalion commanders. Bouquet had 
devoted his training abilities to "combining the 
qualities of a scout v.rith the discipline of a trained 
soldier" in all soldiers coming under his 
command. During his seven years in theatre he 
had strived to develop his men literally as 
"hunters" (a direct translation of the German 
"Jaegers") so they would be as adept as their 
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Indian and coureur de bois adversaries. Bouquet 
reminded readers in his personal account of the 
Bushy Run engagement and subsequent 
campaign that there wasn't "anything new or 
extraordinary in this way of fighting which seems 
to have been common to most Barbarians" and 
offered numerous examples, not only from 
antiquity, but from his own personal experiences 
in Europe, pointing to light infantry formations 
such as those raised by Marshal de Saxe and 
Frederick the Great. "51 Fuller wrote that Bouquet 
"studied Indian warfare not to copy it ... but to 
discover its nature so that he might devise a 
system of tactics whereby he could destroy it. "52 
Bouquet identified general maxims that could 
apply to all Indians and coureur de bois. First 
they always " ... surround their enemy. The 
second, that they fight scattered, and never in a 
compact body. The third that they never stand 
their ground when attacked, but immediately give 
way, to return to the charge." It followed then: 
lst. That the troops destined to engage Indians 
must be lightly cloathed, armed and accoutred. 
2nd. That having no resistance to encounter in 
the attack and defence. they are not to be drawn 
up in close order. which will only expose them 
without necessity to a greater loss. 
And, lastly, that all their evolutions must be 
performed with great rapidity; and the men 
enabled by exercise to pursue the''· enemy 
closely. when put to flight. and 
not give them time to rally. 53 
Bouquet's training 
program gave specific 
attention to items such as 
clothing, arms, training, 
construction of camps and 
settlements, logistics and 
tactical manoeuvres to meet 
most contingencies. Under his 
tutelage, the company replaced 
the battalion as the unit of 
manouevre, troops learned 
snapshooting, to fire from the 
prone and kneeling positions, 
wheeling on the run over broken 
terrain, swimming, marching on 
snowshoes. etc. An American 
provincial observing Bouquet's training 
regimen in 1758 before the march by 
General Forbes on Fort Dusquesne 
wrote: "Every afternoon he exercises his 
men in the woods and bushes in the 
manner of his own invention, which will be of 
great service in an engagement with Indians. "54 
It was not until Bushy Run in 1763 during 
Chief Pontiac's Indian uprising, however, that 
he got his chance. Quickly forming a disciplined 
defensive perimeter on the first day, Bouquet 
feigned a weakness in his line on the second 
day to lure the Indians forward. Then, utilising 
terrain- a gully of dead ground- Bouquet sent 
two light companies up to hit the massing 
attackers from the right flank. Completely 
surprised, the Indians were driven at the point 
of the bayonet across the frontage of two other 
companies waiting in ambush - who opened 
fire with deadly precision. The Indians were 
completely routed. 
Bushy Run was a decisive action, in spite of 
the small numbers engaged, as it proved to be 
the turning point in putting down Pontiac's 
Uprising. It had a powerful dampening effect on 
the involved Indian tribes' fighting ardour and 
no further major actions or attacks were mounted 
during the rebellion. Bouquet's success at Bushy 
Run still stands in the annals of British military 
history as "one of the fiercest ever fought with 
Indians" with a codicil by Fortescue as to 
Bouquet's military genius stating that "had any 
man of less experience in such wwjare been in 
command (emphasis mine), its issue might well 
have been disastrous. "55 
Fuller, a well-read military 
historian, is also explicit, 
stating that Bouquet's 
tactics and manoeuvre against 
"a savage foe is probably the most 
ingenious and effective that the history 
of irregular warfare has to record. "56 
Fortescue generously gives the 
soldiers equal billing when he states: 
"the final stratagem whereby 
A private of Goreham's Nova Scotia 
Rangers according to a French 
description of 1 755 which mentions a 
short grey coat and a leather cap. 
Ranger and light infantry units raised 
in North America during the Seven Years' 
War were usually outfitted with caps. 
short coats of various colour such as 
brown, green and blue as weLl as grey, with 
.Indian-style gaiters and moccasins. 
(Reconstruction by G.A. EmbLeLon. 
Courtesy. Dept qf NaLionaL DE;Fense.) 
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success was won reflects equal credit on the 
resource of the commander and the perfect 
steadiness of the men."57 Bouquet modestly 
attributes all to his men; "I cannot sufficiently 
express my admiration for the cool and steady 
behaviour of the troops who did not fire a shot 
without orders, and drove the enemy from their 
posts with fixed bayonets. The conduct of the 
officers is much above my praises. "58 
Conclusion 
'"J""he new light infantry tactical organizations 
1. and skills acquired by the British army in 
North America during the French and Indian War 
went the way of all new innovations when 
peace was achieved. "As must needs be at 
Military pedants in London, having grown fat 
on the stiff mechanical drill of Prussia. could 
not and would not bring themselves to believe. 
in spite of the late wars. that light troops were 
not only an aid, not only a necessity, but an 
integral part of all skilfully organised armies .. 
Nevertheless, a change was taking place, for 
as in France, so also in England, pipe-clay. 
hair-grease and the clockwork manoeuvres of 
the drill square, though they cramped the 
efforts of the few able soldiers who still sought 
to carry on the traditions ofWolfe and Amherst, 
of Howe, Bouquet and Rogers. they could not 
completely cripple them.0 ' 
In l 771, a company of light infantry was re-
introduced to every battalion throughout the line 
regiments, though some had unofficially 
maintained a flank company in addition 
-·•2't,,,, to the grenadier company known as the 
the close of every war, the [Prime 
Minister's l first duty was the reduction 
of the army to peacetime establishment, 
which was effected by disbanding or 
dooming to disbandment all Infantry of 
the Line junior to the 70th Foot and 
all Cavalry junior to the 18th Light 
Dragoons. "59 Thus the 80th Regiment 
~'-'~picket or Highland company. 62 Fuller 
~ ·- believes that this addition of "light 
of Light Armed Foot (Gage's Light 
Infantry) disappeared, though they 
had a year's grace when Pontiac's 
Uprising broke out and Amherst, 
desperate for troops, kept them on 
strength for the duration of the 
conflict. The 60th Foot (Royal 
Americans) survived and became 
the principal guardians of the 
frontier, but were broken up into 
small detachments garrisoning 
myriad, small forts "in the 
wilderness, hundreds of miles 
from any civilised settlement, ill-
fed, ill-provided, ill-cared for -
in a word forgotten. "60 One 
might add ill-exercised and ill-
trained. 
In 1763, all the light 
companies in the British 
army were disbanded. The 
tactical system of Frederick 
the Great was still in place 
and still exerting its 
pervasive influence. Fuller's distress as a 
modern military man vice historian is evident 
when he wrote: 
52 
companies" at this time, however, was little 
more than nominal "window-dressing" as 
most light companies were "looked on as 
penal settlements and were filled with the 
worst characters of the battalions. "63 
j~~~~~~~~~~~j>-" Itwas recognized T~Uiii~ in 1774, 
just one year 
before Lexington, that 
these "light companies" were so 
poorly trained and ignorant oftheir 
duties that General William Howe, 
on the order of King George III, was 
obliged to form a camp at Salisbury 
Plain for the instruction of seven 
companies of light infantry in 
certain manoeuvres of his own 
developed while commanding 
Wolfe's Light Infantry. 64 
Shy, in his excellent study of 
what role the British army played 
Left & Opposite: Privates qf a 
British regular army light infantry 
company. 1770's. Note the special 
dress and equipment oj these men. 
They wear caps instead oj tricorns and coatees 
instead of long tailed coats, and are equipped with 
a powder horn. 
(Sketches by PJ. de Loutherbergh. Anne S.K. Brown 
Military Collection. Brown University. Providence. R.I. 
Photo: R.Chartrand.) 
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in the coming of the American 
Revolution, has more than adequately 
pointed out that the army and its 
political masters in Whitehall were 
confused as to what their actual 
new role was to be in their newly 
acquired American empire. He 
asks: 
What was [Shy's emphasis] the army 
doing in the colonies? No one seemed 
to know. Defense - as is so often the 
case when no one is attacking -looked 
a little ridiculous. The plan for Indian 
management. not quite defense in the 
usual meaning of the word. was 
difficult to grasp .... And there was 
always the hint of duplicity - that the 
British government wanted an army not 
to defend but to control the colonists. J'r\:~~~~ 
The hint concealed a grain of truth, but 
what seemed a half-hearted attempt to 
garrison the backcountry led Americans 
to suspect more was there. 65 
The disbandment of the light 
infantry organizations which were best 
suited to act as a potent gendarmerie 
on the fringes of a wild and 
unpredictable frontier left the typical 
Frederician-style heavy infantry 
battalions concentrated mainly in 
urban and well-colonised areas of the 
Thirteen Colonies and the former New 
France. Thus, an accumulated wealth 
of light infantry tactics and expertise 
specific to the North American theatre, carefully 
cultivated at first by Loudon, Rogers, Howe and 
Amherst, then honed to a fine degree by Wolfe 
and Bouquet, was lost by the absence of a 
clearly defined role for the infantry in America. 
From overseas, a new peacetime political 
administration meant a return to orthodoxy and 
adherence to Frederician tactics to maintain the 
status quo. 
This confusion of role coupled with economic 
restrictions are the main reasons why well-
trained and effective light infantry was not readily 
available as it might have been in the British 
army at the outbreak of the American Revolution 
more than a decade later. During this latter 
conflict, the tactical successes gained by the 
Americans were nearly all in irregular fighting, 
which have been seized upon by American 
historians as proof of war-waging superiority. By 
the middle of the war, British light 
infantry had re-invented itself and 
along with light cavalry had become 
the equal or betters of the American 
backwoodsmen and sharpshooters, 
Fuller writing that "during the last 
three years of [the war] the 
English had so well adapted 
themselves to its nature, that they 
were in no way inferior to their 
opponents "66 Despite tactical 
successes of the Americans in 
irregular warfare fought on the 
periphery, it was George 
Washington's Continental Army, 
however, assisted by French troops 
and the French navy using standard 
European tactics and siege warfare 
of the day, that defeated the British 
army strategically in North America. 
Steele is correct in noting that 
"North American pride in the ways of 
the New World has often led to the 
assumption that, in warfare as in 
everything else, the new men of the 
New World were better than the history 
laden men of the Old." Many American 
historians have used the defeat of 
Braddock and the Americans' later 
successes in the American Revolution 
"with some misrepresentation ... as 
evidence of this superiority. "67 What is 
very clear that the British army came and 
forced its kind of war on the Northern American 
wilderness in the Seven Years' War and adapted 
very quickly to its peculiar brand of partisan 
warfare. The majority of its commanders were 
aware of, and, in certain cases, innovators and 
experts in irregular warfare, quickly creating 
ranger units, light infantry companies and 
battalions (with parallel improvements in dress, 
equipment and tactics) to effectively counter the 
Indians, Canadians and the French with skill 
and confidence. 
The mvth of American superiority of arms 
in irregula~ warfare and its overall contribution 
to the Americans' ultimate victory during the 
Revolution has been highly exaggerated. This 
"misrepresentation," as Steele has termed it, 
serves to partially explain why the achievements 
of British commanders in developing a highly 
53 
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effective light infantry during the Seven Years' 
War in North America have been ignored or 
given scant attention by American historians. 
To recognize the facts would explode the 
"superiority" myth. 
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